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Imagine someone who mentions that she is a 
feminist. Do others think she is warm? Or com-
petent? Many studies have shown that feminists 
generally receive negative evaluations (Ramsey 
et al., 2007). More specifically, they are seen as 
aggressive and “whiny” (Houvouras & Carter, 
2008). But are these evaluations related to femi-
nists as a group, or to the feminist message? In 
other words, are women who label themselves 
feminists judged differently than women who 
label themselves as someone who believes in 
gender equality? In this paper, we hypothesize 
that they are, and we run six studies to test 
whether this may be the case.
One reason why women who label themselves 
feminists are judged differently than women who 
do not label themselves, is because they may be 
seen as holding stronger gender-equality beliefs, 
and because having very strong beliefs is seen as 
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negative. Feminist beliefs correlate with engage-
ment in collective action (Nelson et al., 2008; 
Yoder, Tobias, & Snell, 2011; Zucker, 2004) and 
people negatively evaluate groups that call for 
social change (Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, 
Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013). Activism is seen as an 
attempt at aggressively promoting change and 
therefore activists, including feminists, are associ-
ated with militancy and hostility (Bashir et al., 
2013). People have negative stereotypes of  activ-
ists regardless of  the domain of  activism, partly 
because they have negative attitudes towards 
social change in general; hence, having stronger 
feminist beliefs is also seen as negative. This 
impression that women who label themselves 
feminists have stronger gender-equality beliefs 
than women who do not label themselves might 
not be erroneous; some research shows that 
labeled feminists do indeed have stronger gender-
equality beliefs than nonlabelers and nonfemi-
nists (Aronson, 2003; Smith, 1999). When 
comparing self-identified feminists with women 
who do not label themselves, but who agree with 
feminist values, the former group has higher lev-
els of  feminist consciousness (Zucker, 2004; but 
see Liss, O’Connor, Morosky, & Crawford, 2001; 
Quinn & Radtke, 2006; Roy, Weibust, & Miller, 
2009). Because there is a difference between 
labelers and nonlabelers in strength of  feminist 
beliefs, and perceivers might know this, it could 
be that negative evaluations of  the feminist label 
are in fact due to perceived differences in strength 
of  gender-equality beliefs.
In the current paper, we focus on how femi-
nist identity affects perceptions of  warmth and 
competence because these are the most impor-
tant dimensions in person perception (Bakan, 
1966; see also Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Cuddy, 
Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; 
Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, 
& Xu, 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & 
Kashima, 2005). Specifically, when forming first 
impressions, people immediately, and reliably, 
form judgments of  others’ warmth (to know 
their intentions) and competence (capability to 
pursue those intentions; Bergmann, Eyssel, & 
Kopp, 2012; Holoien & Fiske, 2013; Lydon, 
Jamieson, & Zanna, 1988; Willis & Todorov, 
2006). They also do so when judging outgroups; 
outgroup members are evaluated and stereotyped 
according to their perceived warmth and compe-
tence (Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007; Fiske 
et al., 2002; Judd et al., 2005). The stereotype con-
tent model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002) holds that 
these evaluations are often mixed: Although 
some groups are seen as low in both warmth and 
competence (e.g., poor people) or high in both 
(e.g., the middle class; Fiske et al., 2002), many 
groups are judged differently on both. In other 
words, a group that is seen as low in warmth will 
often be seen as high in competence (and vice 
versa).
Such impressions can be of  great consequence 
to members of  social groups. For example, per-
ceptions of  warmth and competence are impor-
tant factors in hiring decisions, where an increase 
in warmth (and, presumably, a decrease in com-
petence) is associated with a decrease in hiring 
chances for women (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004; 
Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; MacDonald & 
Zanna, 1998; Masser, Grass, & Nesic, 2007; 
Phelan, Moss-Racusin, & Rudman, 2008). 
Important for the present research, warmth and 
competence are relevant for the stereotype of  
feminists (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; 
Reid & Purcell, 2004; Suter & Toller, 2006). In 
particular, feminists are generally seen as high in 
competence, but low in warmth (Fiske et al., 
2002; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998; Twenge & 
Zucker, 1999).
Research Overview
Many women are reluctant to self-identify as fem-
inist although they agree with at least some tenets 
of  feminism (Robnett, Anderson, & Hunter, 
2012). And, for some women, the negative con-
notations of  the feminist stereotype are especially 
important because they fear being negatively eval-
uated (Burn, Aboud, & Moyles, 2000; Charter, 
2015; McCabe, 2005; Suter & Toller, 2006). It is 
important to know whether this hesitation is jus-
tified by investigating whether explicitly self-
labeling as feminist has an effect on evaluations 
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of  warmth and competence. In six studies, we 
test the overall hypothesis that a woman who 
labels herself  feminist will be seen as less warm 
and more competent than a woman who believes 
in gender equality but who does not label herself. 
Study 1 confirms this hypothesis, showing that a 
woman who self-labels as feminist is seen as 
higher in competence, and lower in warmth, than 
a woman who believes in gender equality but 
does not self-label. Evidence from a manipula-
tion check also shows that the feminist label leads 
to perceptions of  stronger gender-equality beliefs 
than simply stating one’s belief  in gender equality. 
Therefore, in Studies 2–6 we test whether this 
strength-of-belief  explanation can indeed explain 
why feminist self-labeling leads to perceptions of  
lower warmth and higher competence than gen-
der-equality beliefs alone.
Study 1a
In Study 1a we test the hypothesis that a woman 
applying for a job who labels herself  as feminist 
will be seen as more competent and less warm 
than a woman who believes in gender equality 
without using that label. We also measure per-
ceived strength of  the target’s feminist beliefs to 
test whether it is affected by labeling.
Method
Participants and design. Dutch students (N = 169) 
from Tilburg University (34 male, 135 female, 
Mage = 19.7 years) participated in return for 
course credit. A target sample size of 150 was 
chosen (80% power, d = 0.45, α = .05; we used 
G*Power 3.1 in this and subsequent studies; Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three condi-
tions (labeling type: feminist-with-label, feminist-
without-label, control). No information regarding 
ethnicity, race, or feminist orientation of partici-
pants was collected in this or subsequent studies.
Manipulation of  feminist self-label. Participants 
imagined that they joined a hiring committee to 
fill the position of  psychology lab manager, read 
a job description, and one of  three fictional résu-
més. Depending on condition, the female appli-
cant either stated having gender-equality beliefs 
and labeled herself  feminist (feminist-with-label), 
expressed gender-equality beliefs without labeling 
(feminist-without-label), or did neither (control). 
Specifically, in the feminist-with-label condition, 
the applicant listed her research interest as “gen-
der equality” and wrote: “As a feminist, I am fas-
cinated with the link between theories in social 
psychology and gender research.” Additionally, 
she listed her academic minor as “women’s stud-
ies.” In the feminist-without-label condition, the 
applicant’s résumé was exactly the same as in the 
feminist-labeled condition, except that the words 
“as a feminist” were omitted. In the control con-
dition, the applicant wrote “I am fascinated with 
the link between theories in social psychology 
and behavioral economics” and listed “econom-
ics” as her academic minor.
Measures
Warmth and competence. After viewing the 
résumé, participants evaluated the applicant 
on two factors: first, warmth (concerned with 
appearance, attractive, fun, likeable, nurtur-
ing, and open-minded; α = .76) which included 
items that were directly related to the concept of  
warmth (such as nurturing), but also items that are 
related to people-pleasing, social-oriented traits, 
and compliance (e.g., concerned with appear-
ance; Brown, 1986; Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske 
et al., 2002; Sanders & Ramasubramanian, 2012). 
The second factor was competence and included 
items such as ambitious, independent, intelligent, 
opinionated, and career-oriented (α = .88; Meijs, 
Ratliff, & Lammers, 2017). The selection of  items 
was based on combining items used earlier to 
evaluate feminists in studies such as those carried 
out by Berryman-Fink and Verderber (1985), by 
Reid and Purcell (2004), and by Suter and Toller 
(2006). Presentation order was randomized. Rat-
ings were given on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree).1
Perceived feminist beliefs. Then, participants 
indicated the extent to which they perceived the 
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applicant held feminist beliefs on a 5-point scale 
(1 = not at all, 5 = extremely).
Manipulation check. Finally, as a manipula-
tion check participants indicated whether the 
applicant identified as a feminist on a 5-point 
scale (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). In all stud-
ies we measured both perceived identification 
with feminism and perceived feminist beliefs: 
Identification with feminism and adoption of  
feminist beliefs are often conflated although 
they are not the same construct (Eisele & Stake, 
2008; Hurt et al., 2007). There are women who 
do not identify as feminist because they do not 
hold feminist beliefs (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & 
Bay-Cheng, 2010), but it is also possible to hold 
feminist beliefs yet not identify as feminist (e.g., 
Meijs et al., 2017). Analysis of  perceived feminist 
beliefs tests whether beliefs are a mediating fac-
tor in perceptions of  warmth and competence 
in feminists. Analysis of  perceived identification 
with feminism serves as a manipulation check to 
test whether our manipulation of  feminist iden-
tification succeeded. A one-way (labeling type: 
feminist-with-label, feminist-without-label, con-
trol) between-participants ANOVA on identifica-
tion showed that the manipulation worked, F(2, 
167) = 44.13, p < .001, η² = .35. Likelihood of  
feminist identification was higher in the feminist-
with-label condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.96) than 
in the feminist-without-label condition (M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.62), t(107.97) = 5.08, p < .001, d = 0.98, 
or the control condition (M = 2.23, SD = 0.98), 
t(111.98) = 8.85, p < .001, d = 1.67. The feminist-
without-label and control conditions also differed, 
t(111) = 4.06, p < .001, d = 0.77.
Results
See Table 1 for all means and standard deviations 
for the warmth, competence, and feminist belief  
measures. One-way ANOVAs were conducted to 
determine differences between the three condi-
tions (labeling type: feminist-with-label, feminist-
without-label, control), with simple post hoc 
comparisons conducted as a follow-up (all data 
files can be obtained from http://osf.io/ca37h).
Warmth. Condition impacted perceptions of  
warmth, F(2, 167) = 4.17, p = .02, η² = .05. Par-
ticipants thought the feminist-with-label was not 
less warm compared to the feminist-without-
label, t(111) = −1.89, p = .06, d = 0.36, but was 
significantly less warm than the control target, 
t(112) = −2.87, p = .005, d = 0.54. The feminist-
without-label was seen as equally warm as the 
control target, t(111) = −0.89, p = .38, d = 0.17.
Competence. A significant main effect of  condi-
tion was observed, F(2, 167) = 3.38, p = .04, η² = 
.04. Participants perceived the feminist-with-label 
as more competent than the feminist-without-
label, t(98.54) = 2.52, p = .01, d = 0.51, but not 
more competent than the control target, t(112) = 
1.83, p = .07, d = 0.35. The feminist-without-label 
was seen as equally competent as the control tar-
get, t(111) = −0.86, p = .39, d = 0.16.
Beliefs. Condition impacted perceived beliefs, 
F(2, 167) = 38.88, p < .001, η² = .32. Participants 
perceived the feminist-with-label to have stronger 
feminist beliefs than the feminist-without-label, 
t(111) = 3.54, p = .001, d = 0.67, who in turn had 
stronger feminist beliefs than the control target, 
t(111) = 5.14, p < .001, d = 0.98.
Study 1b
Study 1b replicates Study 1a with a U.S. sample. 
Although we did not expect any cultural differ-
ences given the cultural proximity, we chose to 
test our question in multiple cultures to increase 
generalizability.
Method
Participants and design. American Amazon MTurk 
users (N = 610; 360 male, 250 female, Mage = 
32.40) participated in return for $0.30. A target 
sample size of 600 was chosen in order to have 
95% power to find a medium effect (d = 0.30). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions (labeling type: feminist-with-
label, feminist-without-label, control) of a 
between-subjects design.2
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for all studies.
Warmth Competence Feminist beliefs
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Study 1a  
 Feminist-with-label 4.25 (0.80) 6.08 (0.85) 5.12 (1.52)
 Feminist-without-label 4.54 (0.82) 5.59 (1.22) 4.09 (1.58)
 Control 4.67 (0.76) 5.76 (1.00) 2.58 (1.55)
Study 1b  
 Feminist-with-label 4.19 (0.83) 5.54 (0.66) 4.63 (0.87)
 Feminist-without-label 4.48 (0.68) 5.46 (0.73) 3.92 (1.45)
 Control 4.50 (0.65) 5.25 (0.81) 2.67 (1.39)
Study 2  
 Feminist-with-label 4.78 (0.83) 5.20 (0.64) 4.09 (0.78)
 Feminist-without-label 4.94 (0.90) 5.19 (0.73) 3.74 (0.90)
 Control 5.23 (0.72) 5.08 (0.76) 2.51 (0.99)
Study 3  
 Feminist-with-label 4.70 (0.83) 5.71 (0.66) 4.50 (0.66)
 Feminist-without-label 4.78 (0.67) 5.60 (0.66) 4.04 (0.80)
 Feminist-only-label 4.78 (0.76) 5.51 (0.65) 3.93 (0.80)
 Control 5.07 (0.60) 5.25 (0.68) 2.55 (0.95)
Study 4  
 Feminist-with-label 4.80 (0.90) 5.49 (0.86) 4.09 (0.78)
 Feminist-without-label 4.81 (0.76) 5.40 (0.74) 3.80 (1.01)
 Feminist-reject-label 4.87 (0.78) 5.34 (0.73) 3.13 (0.95)
 Nonfeminist-with-label 4.54 (1.10) 4.84 (0.94) 4.02 (1.03)
 Nonfeminist-without-label 4.20 (0.86) 4.74 (0.94) 3.60 (1.21)
 Nonfeminist-reject-label 4.41 (1.10) 4.86 (0.96) 3.34 (1.08)
Study 5  
 Strong beliefs 4.61 (1.02) 5.50 (0.82) 4.11 (0.88)
 Weak beliefs 4.75 (0.68) 5.21 (0.66) 3.07 (0.73)
Materials. All materials, measures, and procedure 
were identical to those presented in Study 1a 
(αwarmth = .77, αcompetence = .71).
Manipulation check. A one-way (labeling type: fem-
inist-with-label, feminist-without-label, control) 
between-participants ANOVA on feminist identi-
fication showed a main effect of  labeling type, 
F(2, 595) = 178.12, p < .001, η² = .37. Simple 
post hoc comparisons showed that participants 
thought the feminist-with-label (M = 4.24, SD = 
1.04) would identify more as a feminist than the 
feminist-without-label (M = 3.35, SD = 1.35), 
t(377.89) = 7.41, p < .001, d = 0.76, who would 
identify more as a feminist than the control target 
(M = 2.10, SD = 0.97), t(365.92) = 10.63, p < 
.001, d = 1.11.
Results
See Table 1 for all means and standard devia-
tions for the warmth, competence, and femi-
nist belief  measures. One-way ANOVAs were 
conducted to determine differences between 
the three conditions (labeling type: feminist-
with-label, feminist-without-label, control), 
with simple post hoc comparisons conducted 
as a follow-up. Where Levene’s test indicated 
unequal variances (ps < .001) adjusted t statis-
tics are reported.
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Warmth. A main effect of  condition was 
observed, F(2, 599) = 11.78, p < .001, η² = .04. 
Participants rated the feminist-with-label as less 
warm than the feminist-without-label, t(401) = 
−3.77, p < .001, d = 0.38, and less warm than the 
control target, t(376.37) = −4.29, p < .001, d = 
0.44. The feminist-without-label and the control 
target did not significantly differ from each other, 
t(403) = −0.50, p = .62, d = 0.05.
Competence. Condition impacted competence per-
ceptions, F(2, 600) = 8.31, p < .001, η² = .03. 
Participants rated the feminist-with-label and the 
feminist-without-label as equally competent, 
t(402) = 1.17, p = .24, d = 0.12, and both as more 
competent than the control target, t(400) = 3.93, 
p < .001, d = 0.39, and t(404) = 2.73, p = .007, 
d = 0.27, respectively.
Beliefs. A main effect of  condition was observed, 
F(2, 595) = 123.40, p < .001, η² = .29. Participants 
thought the feminist-with-label had stronger fem-
inist beliefs than the feminist-without-label, 
t(330.06) = 5.97, p < .001, d = 0.66, who in turn 
had stronger feminist beliefs than the control tar-
get, t(400.51) = 8.84, p < .001, d = 0.88.
Discussion
These two studies show that women who label 
themselves feminists are seen as less warm (Study 
1b), more competent (Study 1a), and having 
stronger gender beliefs (Studies 1a, 1b) than women 
who express those same gender-equality beliefs but 
do not self-identify as feminists. Further, in Study 
1b we also found that women who express gender-
equality beliefs are seen as more competent and just 
as warm as women in the control condition. This 
strengthens our reasoning that the feminist label 
cues strength of  feminist beliefs which influences 
perceptions of  warmth and competence, as now 
we find that merely expressing beliefs also influ-
ences perceptions of  competence.
Study 2
In Study 2 we sought to replicate the results 
of  Studies 1a and 1b with judgments of  first 
impressions in an interpersonal situation rather 
than from a résumé. In Studies 1a and 1b, as part 
of  the manipulation, we listed the academic 
major/minor of  the vignette applicant in the 
control condition as “economics”—a field that 
may be seen as more masculine, which may have 
affected the results of  feminist labeling on per-
ceived warmth and competence. We therefore 
changed the control condition to “current litera-
ture and films.” Moreover, in Studies 1a and 1b, 
the feminist-with-label condition did not include 
any explicit reference to being supportive of  gen-
der equality. We added this explicit reference in all 
other studies. Finally, Study 2 tests whether femi-
nist labels increase perceived competence and 
reduce perceived warmth when applied by another 
person—or only when self-applied, given that this 
expresses one’s own identity (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & 
Wetherell, 1987). If, however, strength of  feminist 
beliefs is conveyed by means of  the feminist label, 
it could be that the strength of  the cue is inde-
pendent of  who applies the label.
Method
Participants and design. American Amazon MTurk 
users (N = 302; 166 male, 136 female, Mage = 
33.70, SD = 12.00) participated in return for 
$0.30. A target sample size of 300 was chosen 
(power 80%, d = 0.30). Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the conditions of a 3 
(labeling type: feminist-with-label, feminist-
without-label, control) x 2 (introduction method: 
self-introduction, other-introduction) between-
participants design.
Manipulation. Participants imagined having a 
drink with coworkers after work. When Jenny—a 
friend of  a coworker—is introduced, the topic of  
Jenny’s blog is discussed. Depending on condi-
tion, Jenny either states writing about gender-
equality and labels herself  feminist 
(feminist-with-label: “As a feminist, I mostly write 
about gender equality and other gender issues”) 
or writes about gender equality without labeling 
herself  feminist (feminist-without-label: “I 
mostly write about gender equality and other 
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gender issues”), or does not write about gender 
equality at all (control: “I write about current lit-
erature and films”). In the self-introduction con-
dition, Jenny herself  discusses her blog and in the 
other-introduction condition, a coworker dis-
cusses the blog.
Measures and procedure. All measures and proce-
dure were identical to those presented in Study 1b 
(αwarmth = .91, αcompetence = .82).
Manipulation check. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-
with-label, feminist-without-label, control) x 2 
(introduction method: self-introduction, other-
introduction) ANOVA on feminist identifica-
tion showed that the manipulation worked, F(2, 
296) = 91.57, p < .001, η² = .38. Simple post hoc 
comparisons showed that likelihood of  feminist 
identification was higher in the feminist-with-
label condition (M = 5.88, SD = 1.65) than in 
the feminist-without-label condition (M = 4.97, 
SD = 1.70), t(198.67) = 3.87, p < .001, d = 0.55, 
which was higher than the control condition (M 
= 2.88, SD = 1.51), t(195.96) = 9.21, p < .001, 
d = 1.32. No other main and interaction effects 
were significant, ps > .10.
Results
See Table 1 for all means and standard deviations 
for warmth, competence, and feminist belief  
measures. A 3 (labeling type: feminist-with-label, 
feminist-without-label, control) x 2 (introduction 
method: self-introduction, other-introduction) 
ANOVA was conducted on each of  the depend-
ent measures with simple post hoc comparisons 
conducted as follow-ups.
Warmth. We found a main effect of  labeling type 
on warmth, F(2, 296) = 7.90, p < .001, η² = .009. 
Participants thought the feminist-with-label and 
the feminist-without-label were less warm than 
the control target, t(200) = −4.11, p < .001, d = 
0.58 and t(199) = −2.56, p = .01, d = 0.36. The 
feminist-with-label was equally warm as the fem-
inist-without-label, t(199) = −1.28, p = .20, d = 
0.18. No other main and interaction effects were 
significant, ps > .10.
Competence. No significant effects of  the manipu-
lated variables on competence were observed, ps 
> .11.
Beliefs. A main effect of  labeling on beliefs was 
observed, F(2, 296) = 86.87, p < .001, η² = .37. 
Participants thought the feminist-with-label had 
stronger feminist beliefs than the feminist-with-
out-label, t(194.54) = 2.95, p = .004, d = 0.42, 
who in turn had stronger feminist beliefs than the 
control target, t(199) = 9.22, p < .001, d = 1.31. 
No other main and interaction effects were sig-
nificant, ps > .33.
Discussion
In contrast to Studies 1a and 1b, women who 
labelled themselves as feminists and women who 
expressed the same gender-equality beliefs were 
seen as less warm than women in the control con-
dition, but no differences were observed in per-
ceptions of  competence. This could be due to the 
fact that we found a weaker effect (d = 0.14) than 
expected (d = 0.30). Alternatively, it could be that 
participants in our control condition inferred that 
Jenny was writing about feminist literature. To 
address this, the control condition changed in 
Studies 3 and 4 to “wildlife and nature documentaries.” 
Women who labelled themselves as feminists 
were seen as having stronger feminist beliefs than 
women who merely expressed believing in gender 
equality. These results imply that it is not merely 
the feminist label that stands out and causes 
changes in perceptions of  warmth and compe-
tence, but that strength of  feminist beliefs trig-
gers this. This is endorsed by the fact that this 
pattern of  the strength of  feminist beliefs is 
found in all three studies.
Study 3
In Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, participants judged a 
woman who labelled herself  feminist who also 
stated that she studies or writes about gender 
equality. Therefore in Study 3, to more explicitly 
and strictly test whether the feminist label by 
itself  influences ratings of  warmth and compe-
tence, we disentangled the feminist label and 
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feminist beliefs by adding a condition in which a 
woman uses the feminist label, but does not 
express feminist beliefs.
Method
Participants and design. American MTurk users 
(N = 403; 244 male, 159 female, Mage = 33.38) 
participated in return for $0.30. A target sample 
size of 400 was chosen (95% power, d = 0.35). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions (labeling type: feminist-with-
label, feminist-without-label, feminist-only-
label, control).
Manipulation. Participants followed the same 
procedure as in Study 2, but an extra condition 
was added in which the feminist label was pre-
sented, but there was no reference to gender-
equality beliefs (feminist-only-label condition). 
Specifically, Jenny in this condition introduced 
herself  by “Although I am a feminist, I mostly 
write about wildlife and nature documenta-
ries.” The control condition was changed to “I 
mostly write about wildlife and nature 
documentaries.”
Measures and procedure. All measures and proce-
dure were identical to those presented in Study 2 
(αwarmth = .76, αcompetence = .71).
Manipulation check. A one-way (labeling type: 
feminist-with-label, feminist-without-label, 
feminist-only-label, control) ANOVA on iden-
tification as a feminist showed our manipula-
tion worked, F(3, 397) = 131.14, p < .001, η² = 
.50. Simple post hoc comparisons showed that 
participants thought the feminist-with-label (M 
= 4.53, SD = 0.71) identified more as a femi-
nist than the feminist-without-label (M = 4.01, 
SD = 0.87), the feminist-only-label (M = 4.18, 
SD = 0.77), and the control condition target 
(M = 2.40, SD = 0.96), ps < .015, ds = 0.47–
2.52. The feminist-without-label and the femi-
nist-only-label were identified equally as a 
feminist, p = .48, but more than the control 
target, ps < .001, ds = 2.05– 2.37.
Results
See Table 1 for all means and standard deviations 
for the warmth, competence, and feminist belief  
measures. One-way ANOVAs were conducted to 
determine differences between the four conditions 
(labeling type: feminist-with-label, feminist-with-
out-label, feminist-only-label, control), with simple 
post hoc comparisons conducted as a follow-up.
Warmth. An effect of  labeling type was demon-
strated, F(3, 399) = 5.07, p = .002, η² = .04. Par-
ticipants rated the feminist-with-label, the 
feminist-without-label, and the feminist-only-
label as equally warm, ps > .46. These three 
women were all seen as less warm than the con-
trol condition target, ps < .004, ds = 0.42–0.51.
Competence. Labeling type impacted perceptions of  
competence, F(3, 399) = 8.68, p < .001, η² = .06. 
Participants rated the feminist-with-label and the 
feminist-without-label as equally competent, t(200) 
= 1.22, p = .22, d = 0.17. The feminist-with-label 
was seen as more competent than the femi-
nist-only-label and the control condition target, 
ps < .03. The feminist-without-label was not seen 
as more competent than the feminist-only-label, 
t(195) = 0.97, p = .33, d = 0.14, but was seen as 
more competent than the control target, t(198) = 
3.58, p < .001, d = 0.51. The feminist-only-label 
and the control target also significantly differed 
from each other, t(199) = −2.66, p = .009, d = 0.38.
Beliefs. Labeling impacted perceived feminist 
beliefs, F(3, 397) = 110.84, p < .001, η² = .46. 
Participants thought the feminist-with-label had 
stronger feminist beliefs than the feminist-with-
out-label, the feminist-only-label, and the control 
target, ps < .001, ds = 0.63–2.38. The feminist-
without-label and the feminist-only-label were 
seen as equal in beliefs, p = .77, but as stronger in 
beliefs than the control condition target, ps < 
.001, ds = 1.57–1.70.
Discussion
Study 3 confirms that women who label them-
selves feminists are perceived to have stronger 
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gender-equality beliefs than women who merely 
express gender-equality beliefs. In contrast to 
Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, both women are seen as 
equally warm and competent. Women who 
merely label themselves feminists but do not 
express any gender-equality beliefs are seen as 
equally competent, equally warm, and having 
equal gender-equality beliefs in comparison to 
women who express gender-equality beliefs. In 
this study we thus found evidence that the mere 
usage of  the feminist label implies some adher-
ence to feminist ideology and that the feminist 
label cues strength of  feminist beliefs.
Study 4
Some women actively distance themselves from 
the feminist label. For example, when singer Katy 
Perry won the Billboard Women in Music Award 
2012, she stated in her acceptance speech: “I am 
not a feminist, but I do believe in the strength of  
women” (Hampp, 2012). In Study 4 we explore 
the idea that denial of  the feminist label has a 
reverse effect on warmth and competence rat-
ings—and thus increases warmth and decreases 
competence. If  endorsing a feminist label affects 
warmth and competence, then denying that label 
may produce opposite consequences (Bay-Cheng 
& Zucker, 2007; Downing & Roush, 1985; 
Duncan, 2010; Zucker, 2004).
Method
Participants and design. American MTurk users (N 
= 631; 419 male, 212 female, Mage = 31.39) partici-
pated in return for $0.30. A target sample size of 
600 was chosen (95% power, d = 0.30). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of six condi-
tions in a 3 (labeling type: with-label, without-label, 
reject-label) x 2 (classification: feminist, nonfemi-
nist) between-participants design.
Manipulation. Participants followed the same 
procedure and materials as in Study 3. The 
feminist classification conditions were the 
same as in Study 3: Jenny either stated believing 
in gender equality and labeled herself  feminist 
(feminist-with-label) or that she merely believed 
in gender equality (feminist-without-label). In 
the added condition, Jenny stated that she 
believed in gender equality, but did not call her-
self  feminist (feminist-reject-label; “Jenny says 
she believes in gender equality but does not call 
herself  a feminist.”)
In the nonfeminist classification conditions, 
Jenny either stated not believing in gender equal-
ity and labeled herself  nonfeminist (nonfeminist-
with-label; “Jenny says she does not believe in 
gender equality and calls herself  a nonfeminist”), 
that she did not belief  in gender equality (non-
feminist-without-label; “Jenny says she does not 
believe in gender equality”), or that she did not 
believe in gender equality, but did not call herself  
nonfeminist (nonfeminist-reject-label; “Jenny 
says she does not believe in gender equality but 
does not call herself  a nonfeminist”).
Measures. Participants followed the same proce-
dure and used the same materials as in Study 3 
(αwarmth = .84, αcompetence = .78).
Manipulation check. A 3 (labeling type: with-
label, without-label, reject-label) x 2 (classifica-
tion: feminist, nonfeminist) ANOVA on 
feminist identification showed our manipula-
tion worked: There was a main effect of  labe-
ling type, F(2, 603) = 144.98, p < .001, η² = .33, 
no effect of  classification, F(1, 603) = 0.78, p = 
.38, η² = .001, and an interaction effect of  labe-
ling type and classification, F(2, 603) = 6.45, p = 
.002, η² = .02. Simple post hoc comparisons 
showed that participants thought the feminist-
with-label (M = 4.30, SD = 0.79) would identify 
more as a feminist than the feminist-without-
label (M = 3.67, SD = 1.10) who in turn would 
identify more than the feminist-reject-label (M 
= 2.11, SD = 1.16), ps < .001, ds = 0.65–1.38. 
Regarding the nonfeminist classification, par-
ticipants thought the nonfeminist-with-label (M 
= 4.17, SD = 1.04) would identify more as a 
nonfeminist than the nonfeminist-without-label 
(M = 3.51, SD = 1.50) who in turn would iden-
tify more than the nonfeminist-reject-label (M 
= 2.65, SD = 1.27), ps < .001, ds = 0.89–0.95.
262 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 22(2)
Results
See Table 1 for all means and standard deviations 
for the warmth, competence, and feminist belief  
measures. A series of  3 (labeling type: with-label, 
without-label, reject-label) x 2 (classification: femi-
nist, nonfeminist) between-participants ANOVAs 
were conducted with simple post hoc comparisons.
Warmth. The ANOVA showed no main effect of  
labeling type, F(2, 603) = 1.84, p = .16, η² = .006, 
a main effect of  classification, F(1, 603) = 34.45, 
p < .001, η² = .05, but no interaction effect of  
labeling type and classification, F(2, 603) = 1.95, 
p = .14, η² = .006. Participants thought the 
woman in the feminist classification condition 
was higher in warmth than the woman in the 
nonfeminist classification condition.
Competence. The analysis of  competence showed no 
main effect of  labeling type, F(2, 603) = 0.64, p = 
.53, η² = .002, a main effect of  classification, F(1, 
603) = 73.39, p < .001, η² = .11, but no interaction 
effect of  labeling type and classification, F(2, 603) 
= 0.78, p = .46, η² = .003. Participants thought the 
woman in the feminist classification condition was 
higher in competence than the woman in the non-
feminist classification condition.
Beliefs. Analysis of  beliefs showed a main effect 
of  labeling type, F(2, 603) = 32.94, p < .001, η² = 
.10, no effect of  classification, F(1, 603) = 0.06, 
p = .81, η² < .001, and no interaction effect, 
F(2, 603) = 2.24, p = .11, η² = .007. Participants 
thought the (non)feminist-with-label had stronger 
beliefs than the (non)feminist-without-label who 
in turn had stronger beliefs than the (non)femi-
nist-reject-label, ps < .001, ds = 0.34–0.43.
Discussion
Study 4 confirms that labelers are seen as having 
stronger gender-equality beliefs than nonlabelers. 
Importantly, it did not matter whether the label 
used was the feminist label or the nonfeminist 
label: in both cases use of  the label cued having 
stronger beliefs. Furthermore, we found no evi-
dence that rejecting the feminist label has positive 
consequences: Women who express gender-
equality beliefs, but reject the feminist label are 
seen as equally warm and competent as women 
who merely express gender-equality beliefs.
Study 5
In Study 5 we directly examined the influence of  
strength of  feminist beliefs on the ratings 
of  warmth and competence. Hence, by means 
of  experimental causal chain design (Spencer, 
Zanna, & Fong, 2005), which holds that manip-
ulation of  not only the independent variable but 
also of  the mediating variable (as a second step) 
provides particularly strong evidence for the 
hypothesized causal chain, we manipulated 
strength of  feminist beliefs directly. Therefore, in 
Study 5 the feminist label was not mentioned, but 
merely whether the woman had strong or weak 
feminist beliefs.
Method
Participants and design. American MTurk users (N 
= 214; 141 male, 73 female, Mage = 32.42) partici-
pated in return for $0.30. A target sample size of 
200 was chosen (95% power, d = 0.50). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two con-
ditions (beliefs: strong, weak).
Manipulation. In this study no blog was men-
tioned, because the fact that the person had a 
blog might cue the strength of  her beliefs. There-
fore, it was merely mentioned whether Kate had 
strong beliefs in feminism (“I believe in all tenets 
of  feminism and strongly believe in gender equal-
ity”) or weak beliefs in feminism (“I believe in 
some tenets of  feminism, but disagree with other, 
and to some degree believe in gender equality”).
Measures and procedure. Participants followed the 
same procedure and used the same materials as in 
Study 3 (αwarmth = .81, αcompetence = .77).
Manipulation checks
Beliefs. An independent samples t test showed 
that the woman in the strong-beliefs condition 
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(M = 4.11, SD = 0.88) was seen as having stronger 
feminist beliefs than the woman in the weak-
beliefs condition (M = 3.07, SD = 0.73), t(198) = 
−9.15, p < .001, d = 1.30.
Identification. An independent samples t test 
showed that the woman in the strong-beliefs con-
dition (M = 4.12, SD = 0.91) was seen as more 
likely to identify as a feminist than the woman in 
the weak-beliefs condition (M = 2.84, SD = 0.92), 
t(198) = −9.88, p < .001, d = 1.40.
Results
See Table 1 for all means and standard deviations 
for the warmth, competence, and feminist belief  
measures.
Warmth. An independent samples t test showed 
that the woman in the strong-beliefs condition was 
not seen as less warm than the woman in the weak-
beliefs condition, t(198) = 1.09, p = .28, d = 0.15.
Competence. An independent samples t test 
showed that the woman in the strong-beliefs con-
dition was seen as more competent than the 
woman in the weak-beliefs condition, t(198) = 
−2.83, p = .005, d = 0.40.
Discussion
In Study 5 we directly manipulated strength of  femi-
nist beliefs instead of  cueing this by means of  the 
feminist label. We found that women with strong 
feminist beliefs are seen as more competent than 
women with weak feminist beliefs. We did not find 
that women with strong beliefs are seen as less warm 
than women with weak feminist beliefs. Given that 
the effect was smaller than we had expected (d = 0.15 
instead of  d = 0.50), it could be that we did not 
detect the effect because it is so small.
Integrative Data Analysis of 
Studies
Three of  the five studies support the idea that 
women who label themselves as feminists are seen 
as more competent and less warm than women 
who express gender-equality beliefs, but Studies 2 
and 4 did not support this hypothesis regarding 
competence (Study 2) or both (Study 4). To 
resolve this, we performed an integrative data 
analysis on an aggregated dataset (Curran & 
Hussong, 2009). We included each study condi-
tion that used the same type of  manipulation 
(i.e., we excluded the reject-label conditions of  
Study 4 and all conditions of  Study 5) and 
dependent measures (warmth and competence), 
yielding 1,587 participants (nfeminist-with-label = 566, 
nfeminist-without-label = 559, ncontrol = 462).
Results
Correlations. Table 2 lists correlations between 
warmth, competence, and feminist beliefs. The 
integrative data analysis strategy provides us with 
sufficient statistical power to conduct exploratory 
analyses of these results with participant gender 
as an additional between-subjects factor. There 
was a positive correlation between warmth and 
competence for both male participants (r = .38, p 
< .001) and female participants (r = .35, p < .001). 
These did not differ significantly from one 
another, Z = 0.68, p = .50. There was a negative 
correlation between warmth ratings and feminist 
beliefs for male participants (r = −.22, p < 
.0001), but not for female participants (r = −.07, 
p = .05). This difference was statistically signifi-
cant, Z = −3.02, p = .003. Finally, there was a 
positive correlation between competence and 
feminist beliefs for both, male participants 
(r = .13, p < .001) and female participants 
(r = .19, p < .001). These did not differ signifi-
cantly from one another, Z = −0.60, p = .55. 
There were no differences in correlations among 
the different conditions.
Warmth. A one-way (labeling type: feminist-with-
label, feminist-without-label, control) ANOVA 
on warmth showed a main effect of  labeling type, 
F(2, 1565) = 23.47, p < .001, η² = .03, in which 
the feminist-with-label (M = 4.51, SD = 0.88) was 
seen as less warm than the feminist-without-label 
(M = 4.68, SD = 0.77; p = .001; d = 0.21) who in 
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turn was seen as less warm than the control target 
(M = 4.81, SD = 0.73; p = .002; d = 0.17).
Competence. An ANOVA on competence showed 
a main effect of  labeling type, F(2, 1565) = 14.53, 
p < .001, η² = .02, in which the feminist-with-
label (M = 5.56, SD = 0.76) was seen as more 
competent than the feminist-without-label (M = 
5.44, SD = 0.79; p = .001; d = 0.15) who in turn 
was seen as more competent than the control tar-
get (M = 5.28, SD = 0.82; p = .04; d = 0.20).
Beliefs. An ANOVA on feminist beliefs showed a 
main effect of  labeling type, F(2, 1570) = 367.85, 
p < .001, η² = .32, in which the feminist-with-
label (M = 4.34, SD = 0.84) was seen as having 
more feminist beliefs than the feminist-without-
label (M = 3.82, SD = 1.16; p < .001; d = 0.51) 
who in turn was seen as having more feminist 
beliefs than the control target (M = 2.55, SD = 
1.19; p < .001; d = 1.08).
Participant gender. The integrative data analysis 
strategy provides us with sufficient statistical 
power to conduct exploratory analyses of  these 
results with participant gender as an additional 
between-subjects factor. Although there were 
not any specific a priori predictions about the 
role of  participant gender given the clear impli-
cations for gender relations and gender inequal-
ity, it could be that feminists are seen as more 
warm and competent by women because they 
have a stronger interest in a reversal or dissolu-
tion of  traditional gender roles than men (Rob-
nett et al., 2012). However, there is also evidence 
that there are no participant gender differences 
in the evaluation in a plethora of  psychological 
traits (Hyde, 2005).
The 3 (labeling type: feminist-with-label, fem-
inist-without-label, control) x 2 (participant gen-
der: male, female) between-participants ANOVA 
on warmth showed a main effect of  labeling type, 
F(2, 1572) = 18.76, p < .001, η² = .02, a main 
effect of  participant gender, F(1, 1572) = 19.82, p 
< .001, η² = .01, and no interaction effect of  
labeling type and participant gender, F(2, 1572) = 
2.11, p = .12, η² = .003. We found the same pat-
tern as described before for the effect of  labeling 
type on warmth. Furthermore, female partici-
pants rated all targets as higher in warmth (M = 
4.76, SD = 0.76) than male participants (M = 
4.58, SD = 0.84).
For competence, the same 3 x 2 ANOVA 
showed a main effect of  labeling type, F(2, 1573) 
= 15.67, p < .001, η² = .02, a main effect of  par-
ticipant gender, F(1, 1573) = 42.30, p < .001, η² = 
.03, and no interaction effect of  labeling type and 
participant gender, F(2, 1573) = 0.44, p = .65, η² 
= .001. We found the same pattern as described 
before for the effect of  labeling type on compe-
tence. Furthermore, female participants rated all 
targets as higher in competence (M = 5.58, SD = 
0.79) than male participants (M = 5.32, SD = 
0.77).
Finally, the 3 x 2 ANOVA on strength of  
beliefs showed a main effect of  labeling type, F(2, 
1566) = 366.46, p < .001, η² = .32, a main effect 
of  participant gender, F(1, 1566) = 19.24, p < 
.001, η² = .01, and no interaction effect of  labe-
ling type and participant gender, F(2, 1566) = 
0.95, p = .39, η² = .001. We found the same pat-
tern as described before for the effect of  labeling 
type on strength of  beliefs. Again, female partici-
pants rated all targets as higher in feminist beliefs 
(M = 3.76, SD = 1.24) than male participants (M 
= 3.52, SD = 1.33).
Table 2. Correlations among study variables for the integrative data analysis.
Variables Warmth Competence Feminist beliefs
Warmth −  
Competence .38** −  
Feminist beliefs −.14** .17** −
**p < .01.
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Mediation. A mediation analysis was conducted to 
test whether strength of  feminist beliefs mediates 
the effect of  labeling as feminist or of  believing 
in gender equality on evaluations of  warmth and 
competence. To test this, a regression analysis 
according to the specifications of  PROCESS for 
SPSS using Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrap resam-
ples (Hayes, 2013) was employed with labeling 
type entered as two dummy variables. For direct 
effects of  labeling on warmth and competence 
without beliefs as a mediator entered into the 
model, we refer to the Results section on warmth 
and competence. The analyses for warmth 
revealed that beliefs indeed mediated the effect 
of  labeling type on warmth, B = −0.06, SE = 
0.02, p = .0002, 95% CI [−0.09, −0.03]. This pat-
tern of  mediation was only found for the dummy 
variable differentiating the feminist-without-label 
condition, of  which the direct effect was not sig-
nificant, B = 0.06, SE = 0.05, p = .23, 95% CI 
[−0.04, 0.15], but not for the dummy differentiat-
ing the control condition, of  which the direct 
effect remained significant, B = 0.12, SE = 0.05, 
p = .03, 95% CI [0.01, 0.22]. For competence, the 
analyses revealed that beliefs mediated the effect 
of  labeling type on competence as well, B = 0.09, 
SE = 0.02, p < .0001, 95% CI [0.06, 0.13]. The 
direct effect of  labeling type on competence was 
not significant for any of  the two dummy varia-
bles, B = −0.07, SE = 0.05, p = .14, 95% CI 
[−0.16, 0.02] and B = −0.05, SE = 0.05, p = .33, 
95% CI [−0.15, 0.05].
General Discussion
In this paper we give an answer to the question 
whether women who label themselves as femi-
nists are judged as warmer and less competent 
than women who merely express gender-equality 
beliefs. The integrative data analysis across five 
studies shows that indeed women who label 
themselves as feminists are seen as less warm and 
more competent than women who express gen-
der-equality beliefs but do not label themselves 
feminists. The effect of  labeling on warmth eval-
uations was mediated by the level of  feminist 
beliefs, but only to distinguish between women 
who labeled themselves as feminists and women 
who expressed gender-equality beliefs but did not 
label themselves as feminists, and not for the tar-
get who discussed nature and wildlife. For com-
petence, however, beliefs mediated the effect of  
labeling in all conditions. This difference in evalu-
ations is thus mediated by the idea that women 
who label themselves as feminists are seen as hav-
ing stronger gender-equality beliefs than other 
women. This is also confirmed in the fifth study 
that found that women with strong feminist 
beliefs are seen as more competent than women 
with weak feminist beliefs. Hence, this research 
shows that in addition to the negative evaluations 
of  the feminist stereotype (e.g., Houvouras & 
Carter, 2008; Jenen, Winquist, Arkkelin, & 
Schuster, 2009; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007), the 
feminist label might cue strong gender-equality 
beliefs that in turn are related to differences in 
evaluations. Our findings are further corrobo-
rated by recent findings that both self-labeled 
feminists and women who actively engage in fem-
inist behavior (e.g., confront sexism at work) are 
evaluated more negatively than women who do 
not (Anastosopoulos & Desmarais, 2015). 
Expressing feminist attitudes thus negatively 
affects how women are seen.
Limitations and Future Research 
Directions
There are many definitions of  feminists and indi-
viduals often define feminists differently. In this 
paper we made the assumption that participants 
understood who feminists are regardless of  their 
definition of  feminism. One may consider this a 
limitation of  the research, as some participants 
might have conflated feminist with being a 
woman (Houvouras & Carter, 2008), being an 
activist (Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Suter & 
Toller, 2006), or with negative stereotypes 
(Houvouras & Carter, 2008; Jenen et al., 2009; 
Robnett et al., 2012; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007). 
It could also be that because the egalitarian notion 
that men and women should be equals has 
become generally accepted and is now part of  the 
mainstream culture (McCabe, 2005) and because 
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it is generally believed that society is steadily drift-
ing toward such equality, making it superfluous to 
push the issue of  gender equality (Edley & 
Wetherell, 2001), identifying as a feminist is con-
sidered to be symptomatic of  other, more radical 
beliefs (McCabe, 2005). Such hidden assumptions 
may have been driving the effect on perceptions 
of  warmth and competence. Further research 
may include measures to test participants’ per-
ceptions and definitions of  feminism—in partic-
ular whether they consider feminists as people 
who merely desire and support political, eco-
nomic, and social equality for women, or whether 
they infer more radical goals.
In this research as well as in other work on 
feminism, the focus has been on White women 
in Western countries (but see Robnett & 
Anderson, 2017) both as a participant and as a 
topic of  studies of  feminism. The ethnic back-
ground of  participants in these target evalua-
tions is an important factor to take into account 
in future research: Research has shown that, for 
example, Latina women appreciate dependent 
women as a result of  Marianismo—the idea that 
women should not strive for their own status 
but be dependent on men (Manago, Spears 
Brown, & Leaper, 2009).
In Study 4 we found no effects of  whether 
targets adopted the feminist label or rejected it 
on how they were evaluated (feelings of  warmth 
and competence). In fact, although denial of  the 
feminist label lowers the perception of  the 
strength of  feminist beliefs, the expected bene-
fits of  denial of  the feminist label—for example, 
increase in warmth and decrease in competence 
ratings—were not found. Consistency principles 
might play a role in this. People are motivated to 
predict the world (Schneider, 2004) and seek 
consistency (Festinger, 1957; Gawronski, Strack, 
& Bodenhausen, 2009; Heider, 1958). A contra-
dictory statement such as “I believe in gender 
equality, but I am not a feminist” may undermine 
such motivations and thus cause negative per-
ceptions. Interestingly, although there are many 
women who choose to explicitly deny adopting 
the feminist label (Ellison, 2013; Hampp, 2012; 
Luscombe, 2013; Setoodeh, 2012), the current 
research suggests that there is no apparent direct 
benefit of  this.
A limitation of  the current research is the use 
of  the first-impression paradigm in Studies 3–6. 
Self-presentation motives play an important role 
in first impressions because people generally try 
to construct a desired, beneficial, and believable 
identity (Schlenker, 2003). Observers—in this 
research the participants—are often aware of  
these self-presentation motives and take them 
into account when reporting impressions 
(Schlenker, 2003). Therefore, it could be that our 
participants took these self-presentation motives 
into account when evaluating the targets. This 
might explain the lack in boost of  warmth evalu-
ations for the women who reject the feminist 
label; participants may have simply thought that 
the target rejected the feminist label to construct 
a desired identity. However, given that we use the 
same first-impression paradigm across all condi-
tions, self-presentation motives would be relevant 
in all and therefore cannot explain the differences 
in warmth and competence evaluations between 
the feminists that explicitly use the label and fem-
inists that do not use the label.
On the other hand, self-presentation motives 
might play a role in shaping participants’ own 
responses, given that all studies make use of  
self-reports (Fisher & Katz, 2008; King & 
Bruner, 2000). However, self-reports are partic-
ularly important in sensitive topics such as sub-
stance abuse, alcohol consumption, or mental 
illness (see e.g., Brenner & DeLamater, 2014; 
Dodou & de Winter, 2014; Krumpal, 2013), and 
probably much less in topics such as attitudes 
towards feminists.
The integrative data analysis showed that 
women consistently rated all targets higher on 
warmth, competence, and feminist beliefs than 
men. These higher ratings might be attributed to 
in-group favoritism (Brewer, 1979; Marques & 
Yzerbyt, 1988; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 
1971). Alternatively, it could be that feminists are 
seen as more warm and competent by female par-
ticipants because women have a stronger interest 
in a reversal or dissolution of  traditional gender 
roles than men (Robnett et al., 2012) and 
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therefore in fact really see feminists as more warm 
and competent.
Importantly, this research focuses on per-
ception of  feminist women. Further research 
should investigate whether these findings also 
apply to feminist men, because feminist men 
and women are perceived differently. Feminist 
men are seen favorably, but low in attractive-
ness and masculinity, whereas feminist women 
are seen unfavorably and high in masculinity 
(Anderson, 2009). Moreover, all samples in 
these studies were convenience samples. Given 
that there might be generalizability problems 
with convenience samples (Landers & Behrend, 
2015), replication of  these findings across dif-
ferent samples is advisable.
Conclusion
Six studies showed that women’s feminist labeling 
causes negative perceptions (Aronson, 2003; 
Smith, 1999) because observers infer that these 
women have stronger feminist beliefs and are 
therefore less warm (and more competent) than 
women who merely speak about gender equality. 
In other words, the use of  the feminist label 
serves as a cue of  strength of  feminist beliefs, 
meaning that a woman who labels herself  a femi-
nist will be seen as less warm and more compe-
tent compared to a woman who merely expresses 
the same gender-equality beliefs.
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Notes
1. Other measures that were not directly relevant for 
our hypotheses were included in this study, Study 
1b, and Study 3. These are not discussed but are 
available from a public dataset (http://osf.io/
ca37h).
2. We also manipulated the type of  advertised job 
(see e.g., MacDonald & Zanna, 1998), but did 
not find any significant effects. This is not dis-
cussed further but available from a public dataset 
(http://osf.io/ca37h).
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